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### Off

#### Nuclear energy production exclusively focuses on electricity

Herrsnz, Linares, and Moratilla 8 (L.E. - Unit of Nuclear Safety Research, J.I. and B.Y - Rafael Marino Chair of New Energy Technologies Comillas Pontifical U, "Power cycle assessment of nuclear high temperature gas-cooled reactors," <http://www.ewp.rpi.edu/hartford/users/papers/engr/ernesto/millav/EP/References/Applied%20Thermal%20Engineering%20%5B6%5D.pdf>)

Nonetheless, at present nuclear **energy production** is almost **exclusively focused on electricity generation**, which accounts for only 16% of the energy consumed worldwide (being nearly 80% of the remaining energy obtained by burning fossil fuels [3]). Therefore, nuclear energy contribution to overcome issues like depletion and supply shortages of fossil fuels and global warming would be vigorously reinforced if a wider energy market was addressed. Industrial heat consumption is a good candidate to accomplish such a diversity of energy products. However, most of the industrial process heat applications require much higher temperatures than the operating temperatures of present light water reactors (LWR). Besides, the amount of energy required is never more than a few hundred MWs, while the present systems become competitive only for a thermal production of a few thousand MWs.

#### They lift restrictions that prevent production of MOX fuel- that’s bad

#### Limits- they don’t actually have to affect electricity markets- they could say that they develop MOX and people still use uranium but they get a short term signal adv

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#### Obama using PC to avoid debate on the debt ceiling- he will succeed

Klein 1-2 [Ezra Klein 1-2-2013 Washington Post “Calm down, liberals. The White House won” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/]

Fourth, I don’t think the White House has a shred of credibility when they say they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling. They may not call what they’re about to do negotiating over the debt ceiling, but that’ll be what they’re doing. That said, I’m quite convinced that they don’t intend to be held hostage over the debt ceiling. As a former constitutional law professor, the president sees himself as a steward of the executive branch and is deeply hostile to setting the precedent that congressional minorities can hold presidents hostage through the debt ceiling. At some point in the coming talks, Boehner or McConnell or both are going to realize that the White House really, seriously will not accept a bargain in which what they “got” was an increase in the debt limit, and so they’re going to have to decide at that point whether to crash the global economy.¶ Fifth, the constellation of economic interest groups that converge on Washington understands the debt ceiling better than they did in 2011, are becoming more and more tired of congress’s tendency to negotiate by threatening to trigger economic catastrophes, and is getting better at knowing who to blame. It’s not a meaningless sign that John Engler, the former Republican Governor of Michigan who now leads the Business Roundtable, called for a five-year solution to the debt ceiling. ¶ It’s worth keeping this in perspective: All it means is that the White House can potentially demand a perfectly reasonable compromise of one dollar in revenue-generating tax reform for every dollar in spending cuts. When you add in the fiscal cliff deal, and the 2011 Budget Control Act, that’ll still mean that the total deficit reduction enacted over the last few years tilts heavily towards spending, particularly once you account for reduced war costs. ¶ But that is, arguably, another reason that the White House isn’t in such a bad position here: They’ve set up a definition of success that will sound reasonable to most people — a dollar in tax reform for a dollar in spending cuts — while the Republicans have a very unreasonable sounding definition, in which they get huge cuts to Medicare or they force the United States into default. So while it’s possible that the White House will crumble, rendering itself impotent in negotiations going forward, and while it’s possible that the we’ll breach the debt ceiling, both possibilities seem less likely than Republicans agreeing to a deal that pairs revenue-generating tax reform with spending cuts.

#### MOX use is controversial in Congress – current conflicts about cost and legitimacy

Rob Pavey, 2011 http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2011-09-12/mox-report-congress-six-months-overdue

The mixed oxide, or MOX plant, is designed to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium by blending the material with uranium to make commercial reactor fuel. Efforts to find utilities willing to use the fuel have progressed slowly.¶ In June, the House Appropriations Committee expressed new concerns about the project’s escalating costs and the quest to find clients for the fuel.¶ “The costs of this program continue to escalate, with current estimates of as much as $9.7 billion, just to construct the needed facilities,” committee members wrote in the fiscal 2012 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill.¶ Although the Tennessee Valley Authority is exploring its use in as many as five of its reactors, the recent crisis with Japan’s nuclear program will make such an alliance less likely, and much more difficult, the committee wrote.¶ Josh McConaha, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, said officials are diligently working on the report. “The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility report is currently in progress and will be submitted to Congress as soon as it is completed,” he said.

#### Obama PC is key - failure collapses the global economy

Maass 1-2 [Harold Maass 1-2-2013 The Week “The looming debt-ceiling fight: Worse than the fiscal cliff?” http://theweek.com/article/index/238312/the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-worse-than-the-fiscal-cliff]

Since the agreement heading for Obama's desk doesn't raise the debt ceiling, which we've already hit, says Zachary A. Goldfarb at The Washington Post, it leaves "the Treasury to use what it calls 'extraordinary measures' as long as it can to pay the government's bills." When the bean counters run out of tricks, we could face a "catastrophic default" if Congress doesn't act fast.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation's bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.¶ Obama is still smarting from the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, says Neil Munro at The Daily Caller. In that fight, "the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion." Obama has been complaining about that defeat ever since, and he's vowing not to let it happen again. But the GOP-led House is adamant about using "its authority over the nation's debt ceiling to pressure Obama to shrink future spending."

#### Economic decline causes nuclear conflict

Mathew J. Burrows (counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), PhD in European History from Cambridge University) and Jennifer Harris (a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit) April 2009 “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_Burrows.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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#### The affirmative props up the distinction between licit and illicit nuclear markets that is used to erase difference

Hecht 2010 [Gabrielle is associate professor of history at the University of Michigan, January Technology and Culture¶ Volume 51, Number 1, Project Muse]

The distinction between licit and illicit market activities depended on one's place in the geography of nuclear things. From the late 1970s onward, Namibian yellowcake played a central role in the (cold war, capitalist) uranium market. Its presence and its price helped keep conversion and enrichment plants in business; it fueled power reactors as well as bombs. When the liberation struggles in southern Africa threatened to render its uranium illicit, producers recruited these allies and their technopolitical mechanisms in an increasingly desperate (and ultimately successful) effort to remain in business. In this instance provenance, rather than nuclearity or markets, became reconfigured. The technopolitics of provenance not only served to materially intertwine licit trade and black markets; they also enacted a profound symbolic erasure of African things from Western nuclear systems.

#### Exceptionalism leads to extinction- produces a denial of death that demands constant causalities

Peterson ‘7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 3-8)

While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, 1 do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet dying is something that I do every day. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise." Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis." Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties" for instance, Bauman remarks that "the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed" by securing the "immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).8 The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus dialectically conditioned by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead - both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making racial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its "others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."? For Patterson, slavery - across its various historical forms - emerges as a substitute for death a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, "for a people who made much of their 'newness' - their potential, freedom, and innocence - it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is." For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning ... without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's in-famous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field."!' From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side" so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls" spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations- noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife - would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, "for cultures that fear death ... necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror:' (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims 'to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinscrib[ing] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a self-contained, sell-present entity. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body" does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether - as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."11Drawing from the activist slogan "silence = death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, this imperative to "raise the dead" reverses rather than displaces the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude. That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains implicated in the larger cultural disavowal of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism remains invested - despite all claims to the contrary - in an American exceptionalist project. American exceptionalism names, in part, a fetishization of novelty and futurity that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes eternally present while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

#### The alternative is to reject the Affirmative-Questioning American exceptionalism is key to understanding our place in the world- rejection is key to more productive politics

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.¶ The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities -- from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom -- the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.¶ This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.¶ What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

### Off

#### Natural Gas industry is strong

Smith 2012 [Rebecca Smith Wall Street Journal 3-15-2012 “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html]

Across the country, utilities are turning to natural gas to generate electricity, with 258 plants expected to be built from 2011 through 2015, federal statistics indicate. Not only are gas-fired plants faster to build than reactors, they are much less expensive. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says it costs about $978 per kilowatt of capacity to build and fuel a big gas-fired power plant, compared with $5,339 per kilowatt for a nuclear plant.¶ Already, the inexpensive natural gas is putting downward pressure on electricity costs for consumers and businesses.¶ The EIA has forecast that the nation will add 222 gigawatts of generating capacity between 2010 and 2035—equivalent to one-fifth of the current U.S. capacity. The biggest chunk of that addition—58%—will be fired by natural gas, it said, followed by renewable sources, including hydropower, at 31%, then coal at 8% and nuclear power at 4%.

#### Plan reverses trend of expanded natural gas

Smith 2012 [Rebecca Smith Wall Street Journal 3-15-2012 “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html]

The U.S. nuclear industry seemed to be staging a comeback several years ago, with 15 power companies proposing as many as 29 new reactors. Today, only two projects are moving off the drawing board.¶ What killed the revival wasn't last year's nuclear accident in Japan, nor was it a soft economy that dented demand for electricity. Rather, a shale-gas boom flooded the U.S. market with cheap natural gas, offering utilities a cheaper, less risky alternative to nuclear technology.

#### US Natural gas key to check Russian expansionism

**Medlock et al 2011** (Kenneth B. Medlock III, Ph.D., Amy Myers Jaffe, Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D., July 2011, “Shale Gas and US National Security,” James A. Baker Institute, online)

Natural gas—if not disadvantaged by government policies that protect competing fuels, such as coal—stands to play a very important role in the U.S. energy mix for decades to come. Rising shale gas production has already delivered large beneficial impacts to the United States. Shale gas resources are generally located in close proximity to end-use markets where natural gas is utilized to fuel industry, generate electricity and heat homes. This offers both security of supply and economic benefits. Rising shale gas supplies have significantly reduced U.S. requirements for imported liquefied natural gas (LNG), which has already had geopolitical implications. For example, it has played a key role in weakening Russia’s ability to wield an “energy weapon” over its European customers by increasing alternative supplies to Europe in the form of LNG displaced from the U.S. market. Rising shale gas supply has also led to lower domestic natural gas prices, which lowers the costs of initiatives to diversify the American automobile fleet to run on non-oil based fuels such as electricity and compressed natural gas. In both the U.S. and abroad, the promise of growing shale gas production has raised the prospects for greater use of natural gas, an outcome with significant implications for global environmental objectives since lower-cost natural gas can displace fuels associated with higher air pollution and greater carbon intensity, such as coal and oil. Without doubt, the natural gas supply picture in North America has changed substantially, and it has had a ripple effect around the globe not only through displacement of supplies in global trade but also by fostering a growing interest in shale resource potential in other parts of the world. Thus, North American shale gas developments are having effects far beyond the North American market, and these impacts are likely to expand over time. Prior to the innovations leading to the recent increases in shale gas production, huge declines were expected in domestic production in the United States, Canada, and the North Sea. This meant an increasing reliance on foreign supplies at a time when natural gas was becoming more important as a source of energy. Shale gas developments stand to exert enormous influence on the structure of the global gas market. Throughout the 1990s, natural gas producers in the Middle East and Africa, anticipating rising demand for LNG from the United States in particular, began investing heavily in expanding LNG export capability, concomitant with investments in regasification being made in the United States. But the rapid growth in shale gas production has since turned such expectations upside down and rendered many of those investments obsolete. Import terminals for LNG are now scarcely utilized, and the prospects that the United States will become highly dependent on LNG imports in the coming years are receding, with some proposals now emerging for exports of LNG from North America. Rising shale gas production in the United States is already impacting markets abroad. In particular, LNG supplies whose development was anchored to the belief that the United States would be a premium market are now being diverted to European and Asian buyers. Not only has this immediately presented consumers in Europe with an alternative to Russian pipeline supplies, it is also exerting pressure on the status quo of indexing gas sales to a premium marker determined by the price of petroleum products. In fact, Russia has already had to accept lower prices for its natural gas and is now allowing a portion of its sales in Europe to be indexed to spot natural gas markets, or regional market hubs, rather than oil prices. This change in pricing terms signals a major paradigm shift. The recent developments around shale in the United States are also having another, potentially market structure altering, effect. Revelations about the existence of technically—and possibly commercially—viable shale gas resources are also occurring in other regions around the world, with shale gas potential being discussed in Europe, China, India, Australia, and elsewhere. To be sure, the enormity of global shale gas potential will have significant geopolitical ramifications and exert a powerful influence on U.S. energy and foreign policy. The state of knowledge regarding the amount of shale gas that is economically recoverable has changed rapidly over the last 10 years. A simple chronology is as follows: • As recently as 2003, the National Petroleum Council2 estimated that about 38 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of technically recoverable resources were spread across multiple basins in the North America. • In 2005, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) was using an estimate of 140 tcf in its Annual Energy Outlook as a mean for North American technically recoverable shale gas resources. • In 2008, Navigant Consulting, Inc.3 estimated a range of between 380 tcf and 900 tcf of technically recoverable resources, putting the mean at about 640 tcf. • In 2009, the Potential Gas Committee4 put its mean estimate at just over 680 tcf. • In 2011, Advanced Resources International (ARI) reported an estimate of about 1,930 tcf for North America, with over 860 tcf in U.S. gas shales alone.5 Note that although each assessment listed above is from an independent source, the estimates are increasing over time as more drilling occurs and technological advances are made, which is an indication of the learning-by-doing that is still occurring in this important play. Moreover, the shift in the generally accepted assessment of recoverable shale resources has left producers, consumers, and governments all grappling with the implications for markets and geopolitics. Utilizing scenario analysis based on peer-reviewed, scientific assessments of the properties of shales (which the Baker Institute then uses to develop its own technically recoverable estimates and associated finding and development cost curves), this Baker Institute study, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, is able to demonstrate that U.S. shale gas can help abate the enhancement of geopolitical power wielded by key petro-states as global primary energy use shifts increasingly to natural gas. Specifically, shale gas will play a critical role in diminishing the petro-power of major natural gas producers in the Middle East, Russia, and Venezuela and will be a major factor limiting global dependence on natural gas supplies from the same unstable regions that are currently uncertain sources of the global supply of oil. In this way, shale gas can play a critical role in averting a reinforcement of the political risk we currently face in the global oil market. The geopolitical repercussions of expanding shale gas production include the following: • Virtually eliminates U.S. requirements for imported LNG for at least two decades • Reduces competition for LNG supplies from the Middle East, thereby moderating prices and spurring greater use of natural gas, an outcome with significant implications for global environmental objectives • Combats the long-term potential monopoly power of a “gas OPEC” or a single producer such as Russia to exercise dominance over large natural gas consumers in Europe or elsewhere • Reduces Russia’s market share in non-FSU Europe from 27 percent in 2009 to about 13 percent by 2040, reducing the chances that Moscow can use energy as a tool for political gain • Reduces the future share of world gas supply from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela; without shale discoveries, these nations would have accounted for about 33 percent of global gas supply in 2040, but with shale, this is reduced to 26 percent • Reduces the opportunity for Venezuela to become a major LNG exporter and thereby lowers longer-term dependence in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe on Venezuelan LNG • Reduces U.S. and Chinese dependence on Middle East natural gas supplies, lowering the incentives for geopolitical and commercial competition between the two largest consuming countries and providing both countries with new opportunities to diversify their energy supply • Reduces Iran’s ability to tap energy diplomacy as a means to strengthen its regional power or to buttress its nuclear aspirations.

#### Expansionism causes global nuclear war

**Blank 2009** (Stephen Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online)

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation. 168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need. 169 Simultaneously, The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author 170 ) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances 7 in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD. 171 Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.

### Off

#### The United States federal government should establish a Quadrennial Energy Review. In the Quadrennial Energy Review, the United States federal government should include a recommendation to remove its restrictions on the creation and use of mixed oxide fuel in commercial nuclear power generation.

#### CP competes – it tests the word “resolved” which means “to make a firm decision about”, the word “should” which is “used to imply obligation or duty”

[American Heritage Dictionary at dictionary.com]

#### The CP is a distinct option from the plan and overcomes agency conflict- also avoids politics and provides greater certainty

Moniz 12 [Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Spring 2012, Stimulating Energy Technology Innovation, Daedalus, Vol. 141, No. 2, Pages 81-93]

It should come as no surprise that I do not have the answers for how the government should intersect the latter stages of the innovation process in a general sense. However, PCAST recommended a pragmatic approach to an integrated federal energy policy that would employ all the tools available to the government in a coherent way. Termed **the** Quadrennial Energy Review (**QER**), the process is necessarily complex, but **history suggests** that **anything short of a full multiagency effort is unlikely to provide a robust plan that accounts for the many threads of an energy policy**. Furthermore, a degree of analysis is required that has not been present in previous efforts.¶ Energy policy is derivative of many policies: environment, technology and competitiveness, diplomacy and security, natural resources, and land and food, among many others. Indeed, multiple agencies that are not labeled “energy” have major equities and long-held perspectives on key elements of energy policy. Often, the preferred policies for different agencies’ agendas conflict. Further, states and local governments play a strong role, for example with building codes, and their approaches can vary dramatically in different parts of the country; certainly, California’s energy policies have influenced the national market. The tools available to support innovation are also diverse, ranging from direct support of RD&D to a variety of economic incentives, regulation, standards, and federal procurement, among other instruments. Congress is equally fragmented: in the House of Representatives and Senate, many committees beyond those tasked with energy policy have equities that mirror those of the different executive agencies. **To overcome this fragmentation** of responsibilities and perspectives, and **especially if the goal is a plan that has staying power in advancing adoption and diffusion, PCAST recommended a QER process** to provide a multiyear roadmap that:¶• lays out an integrated view of short-, intermediate-, and long-term objectives for Federal energy policy in the context of economic, environmental, and security priorities;¶ • outlines **legislative proposals** to Congress;¶ • puts forward anticipated Executive actions (programmatic, regulatory, fiscal, and so on) coordinated across multiple agencies;¶ • **identifies resource requirements** for the RD&D programs **and** for innovation **incentive programs**; and, most important,¶ • provides a strong analytical base.14¶ This is a tall order intellectually and organizationally. Several process elements are essential to fostering a chance for success. First, the Executive Office of the President (eop) must use its convening power to ensure effective cooperation among the myriad relevant agencies. However, the capacity to carry out such an exercise and to sustain it does not (and should not) reside in the eop. The doe is the logical home for a substantial Executive Secretariat supporting the eop interagency process that would present decision recommendations to the president. However, the scope of the analytical capability needed does not currently reside at the doe or any other agency. The doe needs to build this capability, presumably supplemented by contractor support to gather data, develop and run models, and carry out analysis, such as independent energy-system engineering and economic analysis. Market trends and prices would be part of the analysis, including international markets and robust analyses of uncertainty. The Energy Information Administration can help with some data gathering and models, but its independence from the policy function needs to be preserved. The national laboratories also lack this range of functions, and tasking them with providing the analytical support to the policy process would be regarded as a conflict of interest; their focus is best directed at research, invention, and technology transfer. Building this analysis capacity is a large job that will take time.¶ For the QER to succeed, the government must seek substantial input from many quarters in a transparent way; certainly, ongoing dialogue with Congress and the energy industry are essential. The good news is that members of Congress have supported the development of the QER as a way to present a coherent **starting point for congressional action across many committees.** A hope is that **Congress could then use the QER as a basis for** a four or five-year **authorization that would provide the private sector with the increased confidence needed to make sound clean energy investment decisions**.¶ Given the magnitude of the task, PCAST recommended in 2011 that the doe carry out a Quadrennial Technology Review (qtr)–a first step centered in a single department and focused on technology. The qtr resulted in a rebalancing of the R&D portfolio toward the oil dependence challenge through advanced vehicle development, particularly transportation electrification. The key now will be to extend the processes developed for the qtr to the multiagency QER, involving the eop in a leadership role. Taking the next steps in 2012 will maintain momentum and establish the capabilities needed for the QER by early 2015, the time frame recommended by PCAST.¶ While some may view 2015 as a frustratingly long time away, the alternative is to rely on wishes rather than analysis while failing to gain multiple perspectives in a fair and open manner. **Rushing the process will result in a poorly done job that will not accomplish** any of the **key** QER **goals**. Certainly, **it will not bring together succeeding administrations and Congresses around a** reasonably **shared vision** and set of objectives **that can accelerate innovation in service of national competitiveness and environmental and security goals. Continuing with fragmented** and economically inefficient **policies, technologies “du jour,” and frequent shifts will complicate private-sector decisions rather than facilitate innovation**. The government unavoidably plays a strong role in the innovation process, even when this is unacknowledged in policy and political debates. The issue now is to present both a set of principles and fact-based analyses supporting coordinated government-wide actions that earn decent buy-in from major stakeholders.

### Prolif

#### Uncontrolled tech diffusion is collapsing the NPT now

Jonah 2012 [Sunday Jonah is a professor of physics at Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria. He earned his doctorate in nuclear physics in 1995 through a combined program of Ahmadu Bello University and Hungary's University of Debrecen. He has served as a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and as a visiting scholar at Argonne National Laboratory and at Italy's International Center for Theoretical Physics 14 JUNE 2012 “A Tale of Two Treaties?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/tale-of-two-treaties#]

The authors in this Roundtable have all argued, albeit in different ways, that significant changes should be made to the global nonproliferation regime in order to achieve the goals set out in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Changes seem necessary partly because the world in recent years has witnessed a broad diffusion of technology, which has allowed many nations, including developing countries, to harbor ambitions for nuclear power. That has led to the possibility of a global nuclear renaissance -- and also to renewed concerns about nuclear proliferation.

#### Aff revives the NPT

Bengelsdorf 07 (Harold Bengelsdorf consultant and former director of energy department offices, “THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY”, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL\_WHITE\_PAPER\_Final.pdf)

The health of the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure can have an important ¶ bearing in a variety of ways on the ability of the United States to advance its ¶ nonproliferation objectives. During the Atoms for Peace Program and until ¶ the 1970s, the U.S. was the dominant supplier in the international ¶ commercial nuclear power market, and it exercised a strong leadership role ¶ in shaping the global nonproliferation regime. In those early days, the U.S. ¶ also had what was essentially a monopoly in the nuclear fuel supply market. ¶ This capability, among others, allowed the U.S. to promote the widespread ¶ acceptance of nonproliferation norms and restraints, including international ¶ safeguards and physical protection measures, and, most notably, the Treaty ¶ on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United States ¶ concluded agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with other ¶ states, which require strict safeguards, physical protection and other ¶ nonproliferation controls on their civil nuclear programs. ¶ Today due to its political, military and economic position in the world, the ¶ United States continues to exercise great weight in nonproliferation matters. ¶ However, the ability of the United States to promote its nonproliferation ¶ objectives through peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries has ¶ declined. The fact that no new nuclear power plant orders have been placed ¶ in over three decades has led to erosion in the capabilities of the U.S. civil ¶ nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, during the same period, the U.S. share of ¶ the global nuclear market has declined significantly, and several other ¶ countries have launched their own nuclear power programs and have ¶ become major international suppliers in their own right.

#### NPT causes opaque proliferation and nuclear war- ensures that the US leadership falls on deaf ears

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce¶ such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for¶ aspiring nuclear weapons states.¶ 4¶ Opaque proliferation is destabilising to¶ regional security. It breeds miscalculation\*/both overestimation of a state’s¶ nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)\*/that can force neighbouring states into¶ potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is¶ the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop¶ weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less¶ attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the¶ risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot¶ be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be¶ practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or¶ incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a¶ conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also¶ appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments¶ mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).¶ And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine¶ place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons,¶ states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe¶ technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of¶ assistance (Pregenzer 2003).

#### Prolif is inevitable due to security concerns- US prolif leadership only makes it worse- no risk of break- out prolif

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

The drivers of proliferation among several of Asia’s emerging great powers¶ combine both mounting demand-side incentives and crumbling supply-side¶ controls. Neither of these can adequately be addressed by the NPT in its current¶ state. The major demand-side incentives are greater strategic uncertainty among¶ regional powers and a rising thirst for international prestige. At the global level,¶ the actions and statements of the United States, which currently combines a¶ belief in its unassailable power with a post-11 September 2001 conviction of its¶ unrivalled vulnerability, have increased the strategic uncertainties of many¶ states. The current US preoccupation with terrorism and non-proliferation and¶ recent high-visibility demonstrations of US air power have enhanced the¶ credibility of Washington’s threats of coercion against ‘rogue states’. As the¶ United States’ inhibitions against the use of force have fallen, the attractiveness¶ of nuclear weapons\*/the ultimate insurance policy\*/have risen.¶ In Asia, a newly intense pattern of competition and collusion among the¶ current and emerging great powers has further increased the attractiveness of¶ nuclear weapons. China, Japan, India, Russia and Iran have reacted to a range¶ of recent changes\*/rising prosperity, regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq,¶ patterns of alignment and basing during the ‘war on terror’, uncertainties over¶ energy security\*/to create a shifting pattern of alignments and tensions that are¶ yet to settle into a stable and predictable template. In the meantime, this new¶ great power manoeuvring has begun to link up previously separate security¶ dyads and complexes, as combinations of powers jostle for position in¶ Northeast, Southeast, Central, South and Western Asia. This is a fluid and¶ potentially dangerous power dynamic, as Asia’s powers are yet to settle among¶ themselves issues of status, spheres of influence, regional norms of behaviour,¶ patterns of alignment and enmity and tacit conditions governing the use of¶ force. Meanwhile, the threat perceptions of many middle and smaller powers¶ have been raised. As regional rivalries drive various containment and countercontainment strategies (see Paul 2003), and increased strategic uncertainty¶ raises states’ security concerns, the demand-side pressures for nuclear weapons¶ will continue to mount.¶ The other major demand-side driver of proliferation is the growing thirst for¶ status among Asia’s emerging great powers. Rising prosperity and growing¶ nationalism has fed a renewed interest in gaining symbols of international¶ prestige and influence. The campaign of states such as Japan, India, Indonesia¶ and Brazil for permanent seats on the UN Security Council is one manifestation¶ of the new hunger for prestige. Membership of the ‘nuclear club’ has long been¶ recognised as another tacit symbol of great power status. Possession of nuclear¶ weapons is one indicator of membership in the great power ‘club’. The ability to¶ design and manufacture nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles is thought to¶ signal high levels of technological competence, a particularly important status¶ symbol for developing countries (Navais 1990: 9/13).¶ The NPT’s inability either to prevent the spread of nuclear components,¶ materials and technology, or to secure the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear¶ weapons states (as discussed below), only adds to these demand-side pressures.¶ In developing nuclear weapons, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and¶ probably Iran have demonstrated that neither the NPT nor any other¶ international regime provides them with an adequate security guarantee against¶ either nuclear or conventional coercion. To the contrary, by confining the¶ possession of nuclear weapons to some states and not others, the NPT has¶ raised the attractiveness of nuclear weapons for those states not covered by the¶ nuclear weapons states’ guarantees of extended deterrence.¶ These demand-side pressures suggest that the incentives of a small number of¶ states to acquire nuclear weapons will endure over time. Each new nuclear¶ weapons state will give rise to proliferation incentives among a limited number¶ of neighbours and rivals, thereby maintaining a fairly consistent level of¶ proliferation pressure over time. As I discuss below, because the vast majority of¶ states choose to eschew nuclear weapons, because their sense of insecurity is¶ insufficient to justify the costs of possessing nuclear weapons, the risks of a¶ major nuclear ‘break out’ are low. It is the conditions of proliferation, rather¶ than its occurrence, that a new regime should try to regulate.

#### Prolif leadership fails to prevent prolif

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

The failure of the 2005 Review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)¶ to reach agreement on even a ‘single matter of substance’ only confirms that¶ global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction have reached a dangerous¶ precipice (Nason 2005; Cubby 2005). As two observers of the 2003 PrepCom¶ (Preparatory Committee) meeting commented, ‘the NPT review process is under¶ such severe strain that it has been sedated: interaction over difficult issues has¶ been put on hold’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 48). Yet an overwhelming¶ majority of states and commentators advocate persisting with the NPT regime,¶ despite its numerous shortcomings. They do so in the fearful but misguided¶ belief that it represents our ‘last chance’ (Epstein 1976) to ensure a world that is¶ safe from the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The danger in this obsessive¶ focus on the NPT, while failing to acknowledge and confront its fundamental¶ weaknesses, is that states will lose sight of the ultimate objective\*/preventing¶ the threat or use of nuclear weapons\*/and thereby gradually lose their capacity¶ to ensure this objective. My intention here is to provoke debate about the utility¶ of keeping the NPT on life support, as opposed to replacing it with a regime that¶ acknowledges contemporary realities, while developing a more effective¶ compact against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

### Russia

#### No cooperation- Putin hates the US

Rubin 2012 (Trudy Rubin, Inquirer Columnist, March 11, 2012, “Worldview: Putin's paranoia will make a tough customer for U.S.,” Philly, http://articles.philly.com/2012-03-11/news/31145486\_1\_carnegie-moscow-center-vladimir-putin-russian-leader)

Can Washington have a productive relationship with a Russian leader who thinks Americans are out to destroy him? After a week of listening to official anti-American rhetoric in Moscow, I find it hard to see how.¶ Vladimir Putin, newly elected to a third presidential term (after an interval as prime minister), has made clear he believes Washington has him in its crosshairs.¶ "Nobody can impose their policy on us," he proclaimed to a cheering crowd at his victory rally near the Kremlin. "Our people could recognize the provocation from those who want to destroy the country. The Orange scenario will never work here." Putin was referring to the 2004 Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, where street protests overturned a pro-Russian, antidemocratic president. The Russian leader thinks the United States directed the Orange Revolution. He also thinks that Russians protesting rigged elections are paid by the United States.¶ "Putin really believes that the United States is out to get him and intends to have a regime change in Russia," says Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.¶ Indeed, the depth of Putin's paranoia is more germane to future U.S.-Russian relations than whether he rigged the election (even had his margin not been padded by fraud, he still would have won).¶ Some argue Russian foreign policy won't change much under Putin 2.0. After all, President Obama's cooperative relationship with outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev - the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations - required a green light from Putin. Moreover, U.S. officials have received assurances from high-level Russians that, with the election over, U.S.-Russian relations can return to a more even keel.¶ But it's hard to imagine cooperation on issues such as Iran and Syria with a man who feels such personal animosity toward the United States.

#### History disproves miscalc and accidental launch on warning

Podvig 2005 (Pavel Podvig, PhD. Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Reducing the Risk of Accidental Launch: Time for a New Approach? February 2005. http://russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/forces/20050204ponars.shtml)

The discussion of dangers associated with the launch-on-warning posture usually concentrates on the decline of the Russian early-warning and command and control systems. As a result, the efforts to reduce these dangers tend to center on finding ways to convince Russia to reduce the level of readiness of its nuclear forces. Any specific de-alerting measures that are proposed on the U.S. side are seen primarily as a way to create incentives for Russia to reciprocate. This line of argument, however, seems to overestimate the degree to which the Russian strategic forces rely on launch-on-warning as the primary response to a possible attack in their day-to-day operations. The history of the Russian early-warning system shows that although the Soviet military strived to achieve the capability to launch a retaliatory strike on warning, this goal has never been reached. The space-based early warning system built by the Soviet Union was not designed to detect launches of sea-based missiles and the Soviet radar network had serious gaps in coverage. As a result, the Soviet strategic forces could never rely on its early-warning system to provide a complete and accurate assessment of an incoming attack, so their response procedures favored measures that would ensure survivability of the command and control structure over those that would launch missiles immediately in response to the attack. The Soviet military never seemed to have high enough confidence in its early warning system to allow launch-on-warning based solely on the information provided by its satellites and radars. Launch-on-warning would become the primary response option only when additional information was available, as would be the case in a serious crisis when the probability of an attack was considered to be higher than in peacetime. The United States built an early-warning system that was much more capable than its Soviet counterpart; it provided global coverage and very high probability of detection of a missile launch. This allowed the United States to have a very high degree of confidence in the information provided by its early warning system. Paradoxically, this potentially makes a catastrophic technical malfunction of the system (should it ever occur) more dangerous than in the Russian case, since operators may be less likely to question the data provided by the early-warning system. Historical data on false alarm incidents in the U.S. and Soviet/Russian early warning systems seem to support the assumption about relative importance of technical and human factors. For example, in the November 1979 training tape incident in the United States it was information from satellites that helped recognize the alarm as false. In similar incidents in the Soviet Union it was mainly actions of operators who questioned accuracy of the data provided by the early warning sensors that prevented escalation. It is very difficult to quantify relative contribution of various factors into overall vulnerability of systems to a possible technical malfunction. However, the less sophisticated system operated by the Russian strategic forces does not necessarily present substantially greater risk of a catastrophic accident than its U.S. counterpart. The efforts to reduce the risks associated with the launch-on-warning postures of Russian and U.S. strategic forces should therefore treat measures that reduce the level of readiness on either side as net benefit regardless of whether these measures have a chance of being reciprocated.

#### Russian weapons are secure- they have impassable security features and are easily recovered.

Mueller 2008 (John Mueller, pub. date: 1-1-08, Dept. of Political Science Ohio State Univ., “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD,” http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You’d have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission.

#### Norwegian missile accident proves – no Russian dead hand.

Nikolai **Sokov**, pub. date: October **1997**, works @ the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, CSIS, “Could Norway Trigger a Nuclear War? Notes on the Russian Command and Control System,” accessed: 10-2-09, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0024.pdf>

The recently leaked information suggests that the reason for the "mistaken identity" of the Norwegian rocket was technical. The Norwegian rocket used the first stage of an old American tactical missile "Honest John." Consequently, the boost phase speed was higher than usual for previous research launches. The rocket was also unusually large, consisting of three stages and measuring 18.4 meters long and 6 tons. Apparently, it was mistaken for an American Trident IISLBM (its length is 13.4 meters without the front section). The trajectory (to the north from Russia) was also considered "legitimate," since conceivably, a real attack could be preceded by launching a missile to the north of Russia and detonating a device with an extra powerful electromagnetic impulse to knock out communications systems. The computer systems classified it as a combat missile and flashed a warning. The system was automatically activated up to the top, including Yeltsin's "nuclear briefcase." Then, in a matter of minutes, the situation was assessed and the alert status decreased back to normal. Reportedly, the alert did not even reach launch teams at missile bases. Lessons The incident tells much about the Russian command and control system:1. The "mistaken identity" resulted not from an error but from proper functioning. Evidently, the computers are programmed to alert personnel to certain types of missiles and speed is one of the criteria, as is probably size as well. Thus, a rocket that does not have the characteristics of a combat missile is unlikely to provoke an alert.2. Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase probably works only in passive mode, i.e. the whole system has to be put on alert before he issues the command to launch. This is consistent with other publicly available sources, which claim that the participation of the General Staff and/or the SRF is imperative. The military and designers have always been proud of the built-in checks: they view them as a precaution against reckless politicians. An interesting consequence is that the system might be able to function even in the event that the top leadership (the President) is incapacitated. This provides added reliability and removes the rationale for a "dead-hand" system.3. There is not a "dead-hand" system, otherwise a "response" would have followed based on perceived attack. In other words, the case of the Norwegian rocket demonstrated that detection and putting the system on a higher alert status are automated, but command to launch is made by humans. Apparently, there is at least one gap in the chain of automatic response, and the gap is at the crucial link: the decision to launch.4. The incident indirectly demonstrated that the personnel at the missile launchers are "out of the loop:" the information about the suspected attack did not reach them. This means that it is unlikely that they are able to launch weapons independently. Otherwise, they would have received information of an attack, which is vital.

#### No arctic war- No opportunity and coop solves – prefer experts

Young, Professor – Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions @ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD – Yale, 2011

(Oran R, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” *International Affairs* 87:1, p. 185-193)

Popular accounts of the Arctic’s jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like the afore-mentioned ‘who owns the Arctic’ or ‘use it or lose it’. **But these** phrases **turn out to be highly misleading** in this context. **There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty** over northern lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they do not indicate that some level of ‘use’ is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. **There is little prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes.** As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have signed an international treaty resolving their differences regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States are interested in a similar approach with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed 2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, **opportunities arise for** devising **pragmatic arrangements** governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that ‘hot spots’ in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the **Arctic states are living** up to their promises to deal **with jurisdictional issues in** the region in **a peaceful manner.**

# 2NC

## Topicality

### Limits Links

#### There are a bunch of styles of reprocessing and they are distinct

Stephen Berry & George S. Tolley, 11-29-2010, James Franck Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago, Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign Member, Royal Danish Academy of Sciences, member and Home Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, J. Heyrovsky Honorary Medal for Merit in the Chemical Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Senior Scientist Award, Phi Beta Kappa National Lecturer, George S. Tolley is a professor emeritus in Economics at the University of Chicago, fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science, honorary editor, Resource and Energy Economics, honorary Ph.D., North Carolina State University, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” p. 10, <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

The one divergence from solvent extraction methods, pyroprocessing was invented at Argonne National Laboratory where it is still being developed as a part of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) fuel cycle. Unlike the modalities of the PUREX genre, pyroprocessing relies on high temperature pyrometallurgy and electrorefining techniques to separate actinides from spent nuclear fuel. Solvents consist of molten salts and molten metals instead of aqueous organic compounds. This rather distinct process presents a whole new set of advantages as well as challenges to be addressed apart from those previously mentioned.

### 2NC Limits Overview

#### Limits outweigh –

#### A. Most logical—the significance of one-of-many issues is minimal. Constraints inherently increase meaning.

#### B. It’s a precursor—education is inevitable, unfocused education isn’t productive. Limits determine the direction and productivity of learning.

#### Small schools- Huge topic with constantly developing literature magnifies resource disparities- Big programs can have a new aff every other round- No topic generics sufficient to restore balance

#### Key to fairness- essential to ensure that debates at the end of the year have meaningful clash over the mechanism

#### Literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

#### Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

## Russia

#### Bioterrorism is exaggerated – wont cause extinction

Arms Control Center, 2010 (Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, report in response to the Graham-Talent Commission report on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Biological threats: a matter of balance” January 26, google)

• The bioterrorist threat has been greatly exaggerated. • New bioweapons assessments are needed that take into account the complex set of social and technical issues that shape bioweapons development and use by state and non-state actors, and that focus on more plausible threats than the worst-case scenarios that have largely driven discussion to date. • Continuing to emphasize and spend billions of dollars on measures to specifically counter bioterrorist threat scenarios distorts our national understanding of the important issues in public health, and diverts scarce scientific talent and resources away from more pressing public health and natural disease threats. • While it has been argued that spin-offs from biodefense programs contribute to countering natural diseases, the converse is more likely: direct targeting of effort and expenditure on natural disease threats would provide much greater public health benefit, and spin-offs from these programs would significantly strengthen resistance to bioterrorism. • Bioterrorist threats need to be seen and addressed within a wider public health context--as just one of the many possible ways in which infectious agents may harm human, animal, and plant health How Serious is the Bioterrorist Threat? • Beginning in the early 1990s, an increasing amount was written about the threat of bioterrorism. Prior to 2001 most examples of “bioterrorism” were in fact hoaxes or were only tenuously related to actual threats, with the single exception of the use of Salmonella to contaminate salad bars in Oregon in 1984. Much was made of the Japanese group Aum Shinrykio’s unsuccessful attempts to use anthrax and botulinum toxin without drawing the simple and obvious lesson that achieving success in such attempts is difficult. The 2001 anthrax letters were seen as validating large scale and catastrophic threat scenarios, despite the very real difficulties that isolated individuals or small groups would have had in making such material. By the time the source of those letters was identified in August 2008 as a government laboratory with capabilities vastly in excess of those of any terrorist organization, biodefense programs costing tens of billions of dollars were already established, producing a potent and vocal constituency for continued and increased funding. • Offensive, including terrorist, use of biological agents presents major technical problems. This is why the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and others needed to spend vast sums for decades in order to research and develop biological weapons. Even then the results were considered an unreliable form of warfare, and there was little opposition to their elimination by international agreement (indeed the US unilaterally eliminated its biological weapons stockpiles). • Fictional bioterrorism exercises such as Atlantic Storm and Dark Winter routinely used unrealistic values for critical parameters and were unrealizable by putative perpetrators. They tended to gloss over the very real problems involved in acquiring, growing and disseminating smallpox virus on a sufficient scale to represent a major threat. They also posited unreasonable assumptions about issues such as the rate of disease spread, which skewed the outcomes towards inflated and unlikely results.

### China

#### Shared interests keep relations stable, overwhelm all other issues.

Winny Chen, 2010 (Testing Time for U.S.-China Relations, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/china\_relations.html)

Unfortunately, President Obama’s conciliatory approach just postponed the already existing friction in U.S.-China relations. But like the times before, this rough patch will pass, too. The tone may have changed, but the challenges and shared interests ultimately remain the same. The United States and China need each other now more than ever. China needs America’s innovation and purchasing power just as much as the United States needs China’s economic growth to boost its exports and key cooperation on important global issues. China needs American-provided stability in the Asia Pacific in order to sustain its own development, and the United States needs China’s help on pressing regional and international security issues such as North Korea, piracy, and Iran. Continuing to focus on these areas of shared interests, aligning policies where we share objectives, and working through current disagreements, no matter how long it takes is the only way forward. Global problem solving on the hardest issues is made exponentially harder without China. Our national interests require a continued partnership. So even as the two countries brace for a bumpy ride through the next few months, it is important not to lose sight of the shared interests we have across a panoply of issues economic rebalancing, nonproliferation, climate change, and regional security. The key is not to overreact to the mercurial tone, but to stay focused on our shared interests and to keep working toward a mature relationship.

### Japan

#### Japan’s economy is fine now

Napach 1/3 (Bernice Napach, January 3, 2012, “2013 Could Be the Year Japan's Economy Turns Around: Economist,” http://www.cnbc.com/id/100352592)

So much for the lost decade. Despite an economy in recession and a government debt burden twice the size of its GDP, Japan's stock market rallied 23% last year--its biggest gain since 2005 and more than twice the profit in U.S. stocks.¶ "Japan had disappointed so many times in the past when there were reasons to hope for a recovery from several decades of depressed markets and deflation," writes Bill Witherell, chief global economist at Cumberland Advisors, in a recent commentary.¶ But this year will be different, Witherell tells The Daily Ticker. "This year we have a new government..a government that's committed to really do something dramatic to get the economy turned around."¶ Witherell says the Japanese government wants to reduce the value of the yen and implement a large fiscal stimulus. The yen recently fell to a two-year low and could fall further, says Witherell, noting that a weaker yen will help exports.¶ He tells The Daily Ticker that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who was elected late last month has enough of a majority in the lower house "to get him going on [stimulus] spending."¶ That stimulus could be extended if his Liberal Democratic Party wins a majority in the upper house the July elections. "He will want to see early results for the economy to help that election along for him," says Witherell.

#### Japan is growing now

Gulf News 1/1 (“Japan may raise economic growth forecast,” Gulf News, http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/japan-may-raise-economic-growth-forecast-1.1126535)

Tokyo: The Japanese government is expected to raise its economic growth forecast for the next fiscal year to above 2 per cent on hopes that its planned fiscal stimulus package will boost growth, the Yomiuri newspaper reported on Tuesday.¶ The country’s new premier, Shinzo Abe, surged to power in December’s lower house election pledging a big stimulus package to revive the slumping economy. His party officials suggest the plan could total around 10 trillion yen ($116 billion).¶ The government expects such spending to support the economy from the April-June quarter and, coupled with a rebound in overseas growth, would help the economy expand more than initially projected in the next fiscal year beginning in April, the paper said, without citing sources.¶ It also expects growth to be supported by an expected jump in consumer spending in the run-up to a sales tax hike in 2014.

## NPT Bad

### NPT Fails

#### Prolif leadership is ineffective- successes have been overstated

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of¶ status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation¶ was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only¶ magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession¶ of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and¶ South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire¶ nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were¶ building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian¶ Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear\*/not¶ chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The¶ international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring¶ nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the¶ non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s¶ highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and¶ short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of¶ the NPT regime, perhaps terminally.

#### The NPT has no enforcement mechanism- even with greater leadership

Salik 2012 [Naeem Ahmad Salik Before his retirement from Pakistan's military, Brigadier Salik served as director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division, the secretariat of Pakistan's National Command Authority. He has taught at National Defense University in Islamabad and has been a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins University and the Brookings Institution. He is currently pursuing a doctorate in political science and international relations at the Center for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia 14 JUNE 2012 “A Tale of Two Treaties?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/tale-of-two-treaties#]

This is not quite correct. I do recognize, however, that the NPT lacks an organization dedicated to its effective implementation, along the lines of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization. Because the IAEA's founding predated the NPT, and because the agency's primary purpose was to support US President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program, overseeing the treaty is a task that was not originally foreseen and for which the agency is inadequately equipped.¶ Still, those who argue for strengthening the treaty's institutional support and oversight system should remember that, precisely because such structures were not part of the treaty regime as it was approved by signatories, these structures cannot easily be added now. Adding them would require an amendment to the treaty, and such an amendment would not necessarily be accepted by member states. After all, a majority of IAEA members have not ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, despite the passage of seven years.

### Lit Indict of NPT Crowd

#### Your supporters of the NPT and US leadership are epistemologically flawed

Leverett and Leverett 2012 [Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. and a professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs and Hillary Mann Leverett is a Middle East analyst and former State Department and National Security Council official. She is currently the chief executive officer of STRATEGA, a political risk consulting firm. She worked for many years in the US government on a number of Middle East issues, including as Middle East expert for the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff October 18, 2012 “U.S. Efforts to Take Away Iran’s Rights by Unilaterally Rewriting the NPT with Complicity of America’s Iran “Experts”” http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/12992]

”A colleague in D.C. once said this to me about the U.S. nonproliferation epistemic community—and by this community we both meant the entirety of the various NGOs and think tanks and the few University based centers that focus on nonproliferation studies in the U.S.: that the community is very D.C. centric, cliquish, incestuous and self-referential, to its detriment. These words have really stuck with me, because I find them to be absolutely true, and both insightful and parsimonious as I’ve observed the community over the years.¶ I would take it even further and say that in addition, in my opinion, the whole U.S. based nonproliferation experts community—with few exception—is systematically biased toward support of USG positions on all the top nonproliferation issues. They maintain an essentially common narrative and set of emphases that is in line with, and that provides support for, the narrative and emphases of the USG, with only the smallest amounts of quibbling around the edges (Albright will talk all day long about his “aluminum tubes” work). I think that there is in the work of the U.S. nonproliferation epistemic community far too little real, independent evaluation and criticism of USG positions. As I see it, the U.S. nonproliferation community almost acts as a second wave of apologists for U.S. policy, after the USG itself—though it sometimes shrouds this effort in a lot of technical and sometimes academic-looking jargon. But in the end what the U.S. nonproliferation community ABSOLUTELY DOES NOT DO is serve in the role of an independent, rigorous, analytical check on USG nonproliferation positions, as it could and should do, and as the nongovernmental nonproliferation community in other countries does. And I think there are some clear reasons for this. Much more so than in other countries, the members of the U.S. based nonproliferation community tend, with very few exceptions, to¶ 1) have been employed by the USG in the past;¶ 2) want to be employed by the USG in the future;¶ 3) be funded by or hope to be funded by the USG; and/or¶ 4) want to maintain the access and good favor they have with USG officials, for the sake of information and for the sake of invitations to cool events, etc. ¶ Basically what I’m saying is that they are biased towards the positions of the USG, because of their overly close personal and institutional associations with the USG, and because they see their own professional success as being tied to the favor of the USG.¶ I think there’s also a significant degree of media whorishness at work here as well. As a colleague once wrote to me while we were discussing this topic: ‘I think there is another—very important—aspect you may be missing that may even over-ride the ones you mention: aside from taking USG positions, the non-proliferation community likes the high-media profile allotted it, when it loudly tut-tuts 3rd world nuclear arms capacities (or enemies of the west’s nuclear arms capacities), whether or not such capacities are consistent w/ NPT and/or CSAs. People like being quoted, appearing on TV, and generally feeling important. The Non-proliferation community “loves” the attention and basks in this glow, and though they would “privately” acknowledge that Iran is not so far outside bounds (if at all), they nonetheless pass on statements and innuendo to media indicating the alleged dangers and thus wittingly or not, fan the flames. Others like ISIS simply pass on opinions dressed as expert findings. It just would not do for Non-proliferation types to tell the media: “well, no, Iran’s program is actually not a threat to world peace yet” like the DNI did.’”

### A2 Accidents

#### New proliferators obsess over nuclear safety.

Kenneth Waltz (Professor of Political Science @ Columbia, inventor of structural realism and father of deterrence theory) 2003 “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate” p 131

When countries venture into the nuclear game, smallness of numbers works strongly against their accidentally firing nuclear weapons. Small countries fret about the damage they may suffer through retaliation if one or several of their warheads go astray. They guard them with almost paranoiac zeal. Because countries, especially poor ones, can build sizable forces only over long periods of time, they have time to learn how to care for them.

### Regional Regimes Solve

#### Global proliferation regimes fail – specific application is best.

Gerald Steinberg (BESA Center for Strategic Studies) April, 1994 "U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy: Global Regimes and Regional Realities" CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, Vol 15, No 1 http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/usnpt.htm

The uneven pace of proliferation, and the clear distinction between regions, suggests a number of important questions regarding the structure of the existing non-proliferation regime. The regime and most of its components are essentially global in nature. The terms of the NPT and the operations of the Safeguards Division of the IAEA are universal, and designed to apply on an identical basis to all regions and states. Unilateral components of the regime, such as the United States government's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and additional legislation do not distinguish between regions, and do not contain language which would allow for adaptation to specific cases and conditions. (Although American non-proliferation legislation generally allows the President to exempt a particular state from sanctions for non-compliance with limitations and requirements, this process is ad-hoc, and does not alter the essentially global structure, as will be shown below.) U.S. policy makers have also failed to support, and in most cases, have opposed regional nuclear weapons free zones, both in South America and in the Middle East, claiming that multiple structures would undermine the IAEA system.

### A2: Aff Solves Markets

#### Market methods of spreading a nonprolif norm are ineffective- unilateral structures

Lewis 2012 [Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. AUGUST 1, 2012 “It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3]

Creating market incentives to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing seems like a reasonable thing to do -- except that most states make nuclear decisions on something other than a cost basis. Nuclear power enthusiasts have been no strangers to wishful thinking, starting with claims that nuclear energy would be "too cheap to meter." Government decisions about nuclear power tend to prioritize concerns about sovereignty and keeping technological pace with neighbors. It is not hard to see national nuclear programs as something akin to national airlines -- money-losing prestige projects that barely take market forces into account. Often, aspiring nuclear states look to countries like the United States and Japan as models. If such countries invest heavily in fuel-cycle services, developing states might try to copy them rather than simply become their customers.¶ That's why others in the nonproliferation community have argued that the United States should use its desirability as a partner in nuclear cooperation as leverage. States are unlikely to forgo ENR programs simply because the United States or others offer cheap alternatives. A little muscle is called for -- and circumstances have offered leverage: With more than a dozen new agreements to be negotiated, the Obama administration has an opportunity to write into many agreements a new, stronger nonproliferation standard.

#### Asia's shared values prevent war and escalation.

Barry Desker, dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, The Straits Times (Singapore), "Why war is unlikely in Asia" June 25, 2008 lexis

Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of World War II, it will probably not remain the dominant presence in the region over the next 25 years. A rising China will pose a critical challenge to the US, probably more difficult than the challenge posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This will lead to a profound change in the region's strategic environment. But the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is likely. First, a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions. Second, when we examine the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less there than some might have us believe. The Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening - although still worrisome - as some fear. Instead of Washington's perspectives shaping Asia-Pacific affairs coercively, the rise of China is likely to see a new paradigm in international affairs. The nascent 'Beijing Consensus', for want of a better term, would consist of the following attributes: The leadership role of the authoritarian state, a technocratic approach to governance, an emphasis on social rights and obligations over individual rights, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions. The argument that there is an emerging 'Beijing Consensus' is not premised on the rise of the 'East' and decline of the 'West', as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier 1990s 'Asian values' debate. But like the previous debate, this new debate will reflect alternative philosophical traditions. At issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the values China and other states in the region share. By contrast, one conventional American view is that Sino-American competition will result in 'intense security competition with considerable potential for war' in which most of China's neighbours 'will join with the United States to contain China's power'. Asia's shared values are likely to reduce the risk of such conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation of and engagement with China, rather than a confrontation with it. In its interactions with the region, China itself is beginning to be interested in issues of proper governance, the development of domestic institutions and the strengthening of regional institutions. Nor is Chinese policy unchanging, even on the issue of sovereignty. For example, there has been an evolution in Chinese thinking on the question of freedom of passage through the straits of Malacca and Singapore. China supported the claims of the littoral states to sovereign control over the straits when the Law of the Sea Convention was concluded in 1982. But its increasing dependence on imported oil shipped through the straits has led to a shift in favour of burden-sharing, the recognition of the rights of user states and the need for cooperation between littoral states and user states. China has also revised its earlier advocacy of strict non-intervention and non-interference. Its support for global initiatives such as peacekeeping and nuclear non-proliferation - as well as its restrained use of its veto in the UN Security Council and its active role in the World Trade Organisation - indicates it is aware that responsible participation in global institutions can shape perceptions of a rising China. Beijing has also greatly lowered the tone and rhetoric of its strategic competition with the US. This is significant as most South-east Asian states prefer not to have to choose between the US and China, and have adopted 'hedging' strategies in their relationships with the two powers. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is certainly in the midst of the most ambitious upgrading of its combat capabilities since the early 1960s. Its current defence doctrine is centred on the ability to fight 'Limited Local Wars'. The emphasis is on pre-emption, surprise and shock value, given that the earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. Thus the PLA has pursued the acquisition of weapons for asymmetric warfare. It mimics the US military in terms of the ambition and scope of its transformational efforts - and therefore challenges the US military at its own game. Nevertheless, China is still at least two decades behind the US in terms of its defence capabilities. It is certainly acquiring new and better equipment, but its current military buildup is indicative of an evolutionary, steady-state and sustaining - rather than disruptive or revolutionary - innovation and change. War in the Asia-Pacific is unlikely. But the emergence of East Asia, especially China, will require adjustments by the West, just as Asian societies had to adjust to Western norms and values during the American century.

# 1NR

### Faster

#### Double-dip now causes depression - overwhelms their D

Isidore 11 (Financial Correspondent-CNN Money, 8/10, http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/10/news/economy/double\_dip\_recession\_economy/index.htm

Another recession could be even worse than the last one for a few reasons. For starters, the economy is more vulnerable than it was in 2007 when the Great Recession began. In fact, the economy would enter the new recession much weaker than the start of any other downturn since the end of World War II. Unemployment currently stands at 9.1%. In November 2007, the month before the start of the Great Recession, it was just 4.7%. And the large number of Americans who have stopped looking for work in the last few years has left the percentage of the population with a job at a 28-year low. Various parts of the economy also have yet to recover from the last recession and would be at serious risk of lasting damage in a new downturn. Home values continue to lose ground and are projected to continue their fall. While manufacturing has had a nice rebound in the last two years, industrial production is still 18% below pre-recession levels. There are nearly 900 banks on the FDIC's list of troubled institutions, the highest number since 1993. Only 76 banks were at risk as the Great Recession took hold. But what has economists particularly worried is that the tools generally used to try to jumpstart an economy teetering on the edge of recession aren't available this time around. "The reason we didn't go into a depression three years ago is the policy response by Congress and the Fed," said Dan Seiver, a finance professor at San Diego State University. "We won't see that this time." Three times between 2008 and 2010, Congress approved massive spending or temporary tax cuts to try to stimulate the economy. But fresh from the bruising debt ceiling battle and credit rating downgrade, and with elections looming, the federal government has shown little inclination to move in that direction. So this new recession would likely have virtually no policy effort to counteract it.

### Theory

#### Best academic theory validates our impact

Royal 2010 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

### DC K

#### Economic bounceback now- failure to get a deal on debt ceiling and sequester causes collapse

Brown 1-2 [Abram Brown 1-2-2013 Forbes “Fiscal Cliff: Two Monster Problems Loom Ahead. Here's What Happens Next” http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/01/02/u-s-faces-uphill-climb-after-fiscal-cliff-deal-heres-what-happes-next/]

To monitor how investors feel about the progress, look at key bellwether stocks, businesses like Apple and FedEx, that can report tremors in economic conditions throughout the globe. Also, track how risk-off stocks fare: These are large, cash-generative companies like Procter & Gamble and Coca-Cola that investors buy during tiring times.¶ Optimism is already apparent from gains in U.S. and overseas markets. The Dow Jones industrial average climbed 1.4% to 13,286.18—a triple-digit gain of 182 points. The Nasdaq composite rose 2.6% to 3,086.46, and the S&P 500 added 1.9% to 1,452.81.¶ Abroad, the Euro Stoxx 50 climbed by 2.6% to 2,704.61. The FTSE 100 added 2.3% to 6,035.90. Asian markets told a similar story. The Shanghai composite went up 1.3% to 2,269.13, and the Hang Sheng index increased 2.9% to 23,311.98.¶ The length of the rally should seem very much in doubt. “The bare bones agreement to limit the scope of tax increases in 2013 removes for now the threat of immediate, severe fiscal tightening,” says Citi economist Steven Wieting. “However, the incomplete agreement leaves both short-term and long-term spending decisions to the new Congress in just the next couple of months. A two-month delay in sequestration roughly coincides with needed action to raise the Federal debt ceiling.” Wieting adds: “Such further agreements may be reached with even more difficulty.”

#### Most probable- the economy is teetering on the edge- also dries up investment for the Aff

Goldfarb 1-1 [Zachary A. Goldfarb 1-1-2013 Washington Post “‘Fiscal cliff’ deal does little to tame threats from debt ceiling, high unemployment rates” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/fiscal-cliff/fiscal-cliff-deal-does-little-to-tame-threats-from-debt-ceiling-high-unemployment-rates/2013/01/01/8e4c14aa-5393-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f\_story.html]

Leaving the fate of the debt ceiling up in the air will cause anxiety among businesses and individuals, potentially crimping hiring, investing and consumer spending.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation’s bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.¶ And while a default would be all but certain to push the economy into recession, growth is likely to be slow — and job-market improvement slight — even without such a cataclysmic event. The unemployment rate, which stands at 7.7 percent, is not expected to fall below 7.4 percent by the end of this year, and not below 6 percent until at least 2016 or later.

### 2NC UQ A2: Republicans

#### Obama will be strong and successful in debt ceiling fight. \*Also answers the Obama will back down arg – with his wins on tax policy in fiscal cliff legislation

AFP, Cliff avoided, what next? 3 JAN 2013, 6:41 AM - http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1724208/Cliff-avoided,-what-next

On deck now are feuds over lifting the US debt ceiling, funding government operations and over the delayed $109 billion spending broadside that was dodged in the fiscal cliff compromise.¶ ¶ After chaos remarkable even for Washington, the House of Representatives voted late Tuesday to raise tax rates on the rich but to spare the middle class in the other half of the deal.¶ ¶ The graying president could barely wait to skip aboard Air Force One to resume his interrupted vacation -- but before he left, made a plea that seemed redundant almost as soon as it left his lips.¶ ¶ "Hopefully, in the New Year, (what) we'll focus on is seeing if we can put a package like this together with a little bit less drama, a little less brinksmanship, not scare the heck out of folks quite as much."¶ ¶ If the fiscal cliff fight was bitter -- the next boiling skirmishes between the Democratic president and scorched earth Republicans could be worse.¶ ¶ In a stop-gap compromise, Obama and Republicans formed a new series of cliffs, or canyons or whatever pundits call the next crisis.¶ ¶ By delaying spending cuts known as the sequester for two months, they merely postponed a fight on an issue fundamental to the political DNA of each side.¶ ¶ The spending questions will be no easier in February than December.¶ ¶ "When pressed to the limit, political leaders averted some of the most immediate negative consequences of the short-term fiscal cliff," said the Business Roundtable in a statement on Wednesday.¶ ¶ But the coalition of chief executives warned the deal "left unaddressed the most serious and fundamental reforms required for the country's long-term economic health."¶ ¶ Twice now, Obama and House Speaker John Boehner have reached for and failed to grasp a grand bargain to reduce the deficit, which clouds future US economic prospects with its annual $1 trillion price tag.¶ ¶ As a result, threadbare trust between the two men has frayed further and it seems neither can shift their political coalitions sufficiently to frame legacy-enhancing compromises.¶ ¶ Obama and Boehner will next clash over lifting the US government's $16 trillion borrowing limit, known as the debt ceiling, reached on Monday, as the Treasury is forced into extraordinary measures to keep paying the bills.¶ ¶ Republicans believe the debt ceiling fight gives them an opening to demand the big cuts to social welfare programs they failed to insert in the fiscal cliff deal.¶ ¶ Boehner has yet to specifically link the debt ceiling to spending cuts, but under pressure from his caucus, wants to wield the knife hard.¶ ¶ "Without meaningful reform of entitlements, real spending controls, and a fairer, cleaner tax code, our debt will continue to grow, and our economy will continue to stumble," he said.¶ ¶ Republican gunslinger John McCain was more direct.¶ ¶ "I think there is going to be a pretty big showdown next time when we go to the debt limit," the Arizona senator told CNN.¶ ¶ The White House is wary of repeating the chaos sparked by the last debt ceiling fight in 2011, which convinced many investors that the US political system simply does not have the capacity to fix what ails the economy.¶ ¶ "While I will negotiate over many things, I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they've already racked up through the laws that they passed," Obama said Tuesday.¶ ¶ "If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay these bills on time, the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic, far worse than the impact of a fiscal cliff."¶ ¶ It is unclear however how Obama will be able to resist Republican demands for spending cuts in return for lifting the debt ceiling -- other than to dare them to throw the world's most powerful nation into debt default.¶ ¶ That would threaten deep damage to the global economy and could throw America into a recession that could ruin Obama's second term.¶ ¶ Another brewing fight over budget financing that expires on March 27 could lead to a government shutdown if there is no resolution.¶ ¶ "We're going to have to deal with the debt ceiling, we're going to have to deal with the continuing resolution, and we're going to have to deal with the sequester," Democratic lawmaker Jim Moran said Tuesday.¶ ¶ "We're going to look back on this night and regret it."¶ ¶ But as they contemplate skirmishes to come, Obama's staff claims a consequential political victory, after breaking two-decades-old Republican dogma against raising tax rates to find $620 billion in new revenue.¶ ¶ People familiar with Obama's plans believe that the fact he did not bow to Republican demands to find new revenues by closing tax loopholes rather than raising rates is significant and gives him ammunition for new tax fights.

#### Powerful Obama gets Republicans in line

Chaddock 1-2 [Gail Russell Chaddock, Staff writer 1-2-2013 Christian Science Monitor “'Fiscal cliff' deal: After rush of relief, debt ceiling clash already looms” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0102/Fiscal-cliff-deal-After-rush-of-relief-debt-ceiling-clash-already-looms]

But after tough 2012 elections, some House Republicans are wary of confronting the White House on an issue so potentially damaging to the economy.¶ "A lot of people talk about the debt ceiling, but I don’t want to be messing around with the obligations of the federal government,” says Rep. Jim Renacci (R) of Ohio, a veteran of the 2010 tea party class. “We can use that for some leverage, but we should be using every opportunity to cut debt.”

#### Divisions inside the Republican Party prevent them from effectively using leverage on the debt ceiling

Chaddock 1-2 [Gail Russell Chaddock, Staff writer 1-2-2013 Christian Science Monitor “'Fiscal cliff' deal: After rush of relief, debt ceiling clash already looms” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0102/Fiscal-cliff-deal-After-rush-of-relief-debt-ceiling-clash-already-looms]

### A2: Obama will Cave

#### He can hold out

Weyl 1-2 [Ben Weyl Roll Call Staff 1-2-2013 Roll Call “Lawmakers Now Drawing Lines, Eyeing Policy Actions on Debt Limit” http://www.rollcall.com/news/lawmakers\_now\_drawing\_lines\_eyeing\_policy\_actions\_on\_debt\_limit-220488-1.html?pos=oplyh]

But in seeking to build support for the tax cut deal he helped devise, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. assured nervous Democrats during the week that Obama would not again engage in such negotiations. Top Senate Democrats have argued that Republicans will not find much support from the public if they are seen as holding the global economy hostage in order to secure cuts to health programs for the elderly.¶ And if financial markets start to teeter on worries about the U.S. fiscal situation, GOP lawmakers might quickly change their tune.

### A2 Sequester

#### PC gets a sequester deal- that translates to smooth debt ceiling debate

Weisenthal 1-2 [Joe Weisenthal 1-2-2013 Business Insider “Here's What Every Liberal Is Worried That Obama Will Do Next” http://www.businessinsider.com/the-democrats-1-fear-will-obama-cave-on-the-debt-ceiling-2013-1]

This is shaping up to be a big standoff. Obama has flatly said he will not negotiate over raising the debt ceiling (i.e. honoring the nation's obligations). Republicans are spoiling for another 2011-like fight, and are calling it the big opportunity. They also think they have more leverage this time than they had over the Fiscal Cliff fight, since taxes aren't about to rise on 100% of taxpayers.¶ Here's Krugman, who was very hard initially on Obama as details of the deal came out, but moderated his tone a little bit:¶ So why the bad taste in progressives’ mouths? It has less to do with where Obama ended up than with how he got there. He kept drawing lines in the sand, then erasing them and retreating to a new position. And his evident desire to have a deal before hitting the essentially innocuous fiscal cliff bodes very badly for the confrontation looming in a few weeks over the debt ceiling.¶ If Obama stands his ground in that confrontation, this deal won’t look bad in retrospect. If he doesn’t, yesterday will be seen as the day he began throwing away his presidency and the hopes of everyone who supported him.¶ And here's Dean Baker in The Guardian:¶ ...President Obama insisted that he was going to stick to the $250,000 cut-off requiring that the top 2% of households, the big winners in the economy, go back to paying the Clinton era tax rates. He backed away from this commitment even in a context where he held most of the cards. We are now entering a new round of negotiations over extending the debt ceiling where the Republicans would appear to hold many of the cards.¶ While the consequences may not be as dire as the pundits claim, no one could think it would be a good idea to allow the debt ceiling to be reached and force the government into default. The Republicans intend to use this threat, however, to coerce further concessions from President Obama. The president insists that there will be no negotiations over the debt ceiling: no further concessions to protect the country's financial standing.¶ At this point, though, is there any reason for people to believe him?¶ And here's Jonathan Chait:¶ So what we have is two more showdowns in which the parties disagree not just on the outcome but even on the parameters of an outcome. Obama thinks the debt ceiling needs to be raised, full stop, without becoming a bargaining chip in a fight that threatens the stability of the global economy. Republicans want to use that chip. Then there’s the sequester, which Obama thinks should be replaced with spending cuts and tax revenue, and Republicans think should be replaced with spending cuts and more spending cuts.¶ If Obama makes it through both these events without either accepting draconian social policy or triggering an economic meltdown, then today’s compromise will be seen as a clever first step. That’s not what I expect. I expect instead that his willingness to bargain away his strongest leverage, and the central theme of his reelection, will make the next rounds harder, and embolden Republicans further. I suspect he will wish he had ripped off the Band-Aid all at once, holding firm on tax cuts and daring House Republicans to defy public opinion.¶ So there you go. Everyone's worried about another Obama cave in a fight where the GOP feels emboldened.¶ While Obama says he won't bargain on the debt ceiling, he HAS to bargain on the sequester (unless he wants the spending cuts to happen as is) so that's probably where he'll wiggle and end up in a bargain that would likely include the debt ceiling.

### PC Key

#### Obama has the capital to hold off spending cuts as leverage in the debt ceiling debate.

Richard Cowan WASHINGTON | Wed Jan 2, 2013 11:13pm EST http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/03/us-usa-fiscal-republicans-idUSBRE90202U20130103

(Reuters) - In the wake of bruising fights in their own ranks over the "fiscal cliff" and aid for victims of superstorm Sandy - Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives open a new Congress on Thursday more divided than ever.¶ While their leader, Speaker John Boehner, seems in no danger of losing his position because of the divisions, his ability to speak for his membership in the House appears greatly diminished.¶ That could not come at a worse time for Republicans as they prepare for their next attempt to get more spending cuts out of President Barack Obama. They will try to use the debt ceiling - and Obama's request to raise it - as leverage, as they did in 2011.But if the final days of this Congress were indicative of things to come, Republicans will have a rough time effectively using their majority in the House against Obama, who even Republicans acknowledge is at the top of his game following the Democrat's re-election in November.¶ The fiscal cliff battle to avert steep tax hikes and spending cuts that were due to kick in at the start of this year proved gut-wrenching for Republicans.¶ Obama's demand for a tax hike on the rich challenged a core principle that has guided Republicans for decades: No new taxes. Ever.¶ Yet, late on New Year's night, 85 Republicans in the House did just that, voting to raise income taxes on household income of more than $450,000 a year.¶ Some of the Republican Party's biggest stars were among the 85 - including Boehner and Paul Ryan, the 2012 Republican vice presidential candidate, who is seen as a conservative anchor.¶ But 151 House Republicans stood in defiance, leaving Boehner in the unenviable position of having to rely on opposition Democrats to pass major legislation.¶ Earlier in the fiscal cliff fight, Boehner suffered a humiliating defeat when his "Plan B" solution - which would have limited the tax hikes to income of $1 million a year or more, got so little support he had to cancel the vote.

### A2: New Klein Article

#### PC theory true- empirics prove deal making matters- Klein is overly pessimistic

Mandel 3-23 Seth Mandel is Assistant Editor of Commentary magazine. He was a 2011 National Security Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Prior to that, Mandel was Managing Editor of The Jewish State, The Jewish Journal, and The Speaker, where he won Investigative Reporting awards for his coverage of the Second Lebanon War and the Iranian nuclear program, as well as Column Writing and Editorial Writing awards for his coverage of the Middle East. His work has also been published by National Review, the Weekly Standard, the Washington Times, and many other publications. 3-23-2012 <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/03/23/presidential-persuasion-commander-in-chief-obama-reagan-clinton/>

I finally got around to reading Ezra Klein’s interesting take on what I consider to be a fascinating subject: the power of presidents to persuade the public. Klein’s piece, in the March 19 New Yorker, takes a dim view of the practical uses of presidential rhetoric, using mostly presidents Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama as case studies. Reagan, Klein notes, was considered to be a great communicator (or, as he is remembered, the Great Communicator), yet his approval ratings were average and many of his primary policy prescriptions never caught on with the public. Overall, he writes, the same is true of Clinton, Bush, and Obama. Bush was unable to convince the country to accept social security reform, and Obama has been unable to sell additional fiscal stimulus and most notably his health care reform law, which remains broadly unpopular. The overestimation of the power of the bully pulpit, he finds, is more likely to harm a president’s domestic policy agenda than advance it. But I think the key word there is “domestic.” Switch the subject to foreign policy, and the power is somewhat restored. Bush may not have been able to sell Social Security reform, but it would be difficult to conjure a more memorable scene from Bush’s eight years in office than his speech atop the fire truck at Ground Zero after the Sept. 11 terror attacks. It was—and remains—both moving and inspiring to hear the president emerge brilliantly from the shell of his tendency toward the folksy, and sometimes awkward, when ad-libbing, at that scene. It all could have gone very differently, since the bullhorn he was using worked only intermittently, and the crowd began losing patience. Yet, as they shouted that they couldn’t hear him, Bush remained calm, steady, and delivered a fine moment when he responded, “I can hear you. I can hear you, the rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.” Reagan’s most famous line, obviously, was “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” It is what he is remembered for as well—not just the words, but the sentiment, and the political risk involved. Very few conversations about Reagan center on what he said before or after his first-term tax deal with the Democrats. It’s fitting, because though presidential elections usually turn on the economy, the chief executive has more influence on foreign affairs. This is no different for Obama. After Obama announced a troop “surge” in Afghanistan in December 2009, polls showed a 9-percent jump in Americans who thought staying in Afghanistan was the right course of action, and a 6-percent drop in those who opposed the war. Americans favored the speech itself by a 23-point margin. And the president saw a 7-point jump in public approval of his handling of the war. None of this is out of the ordinary. When I interviewed James Robbins about his book on Vietnam, This Time We Win, he argued that polls at the time showed Lyndon Johnson to have more support for the war effort—especially its escalation—than most people think in retrospect. “According to opinion polls at the time taken directly after Tet and a few weeks after Tet, the American people wanted to escalate the war,” Robbins told me. “They understand that the enemy had suffered a terrible defeat, so there was an opportunity if we had taken concerted action to actually win this thing.” Even on college campuses, he said, more people identified as hawks than doves: “The notion that young people were long-haired dope smoking draft resisters in 1967-68 is not true. The ‘Forrest Gump’ view of history is wrong.” If you expand the category to national security in general, Clinton gets a boost as well. This one is more difficult to measure than support for a war, but leading up the Oklahoma City bombing, Clinton had been marginalized to such a degree by Newt Gingrich’s masterful ability to control the narrative that Clinton offered his much-mocked plea at a briefing: “The president is still relevant here.” The bombing happened the next day, and Clinton’s ability to project empathy and his portrayal of opposition to his presidency as right-wing anti-government excess partly to blame for any dark mood in which someone bombs a federal building completely changed the pace and tone of the coverage of his presidency. Speeches delivered in the service of selling a tax increase or even solving a debt-ceiling showdown are often treated as the president taking his eye off the ball. The president as commander-in-chief, however, is a role for which voters consistently express their support. I want to offer Klein one more note of optimism. He writes: Back-room bargains and quiet negotiations do not, however, present an inspiring vision of the Presidency. And they fail, too. Boehner and Obama spent much of last summer sitting in a room together, but, ultimately, the Speaker didn’t make a private deal with the President for the same reason that Republican legislators don’t swoon over a public speech by him: he is the leader of the Democratic Party, and if he wins they lose. This suggests that, as the two parties become more sharply divided, it may become increasingly difficult for a President to govern—and there’s little that he can do about it. I disagree. The details of the deal matter, not just the party lines about the dispute. There is no way the backroom negotiations Clinton conducted with Gingrich over social security reform could have been possible if we had prime ministers, instead of presidents. The president possesses political capital Congress doesn’t. History tells us there are effective ways to use that capital. One lesson: quiet action on domestic policy, visible and audible leadership on national security.

### PC High

#### Obama PC is high

Nelson 1-2 [Colleen McCain Nelson 1-2-2013 Wall Street Journal “The Fiscal Cliff: Lack of Grand Bargain Complicates Obama's Priorities” ProQuest]

Tuesday's developments not only suggest that the White House can strike deals with congressional Republicans in what has seemed like an ossified Washington political culture, but also that Mr. Obama has momentum in pursuing his goals. Mr. Obama appears to have a channel to negotiate with the GOP, by having Vice President Joe Biden work with Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.).¶ The cost to Mr. Obama is some complaining from the political left, which among other things notes that he has abandoned his campaign pledge to raise tax rates on household incomes above $250,000 in favor of the negotiated level of $450,000 for couples.¶ The White House believes the compromise is a victory for the president.¶ A person familiar with the discussions noted that Mr. Obama faced determined Republican opposition and still managed to forge an agreement that raises tax rates for the first time in a generation.

#### Obama PC is high-he’s going to use it on the debt ceiling

Bloomberg 1-2 [Bloomberg 1-2-2013 “Debt-Ceiling Fight Looms Even as Obama Wins Day” Richard Rubin, Roxana Tiron and James Rowley http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01-02/bipartisan-house-backs-tax-deal-vote-as-next-fight-looms#p1]

The U.S. House passed a bill undoing income tax increases for more than 99 percent of households, giving a victory to Obama even as Republicans vowed to fight him in coming weeks for spending cuts in exchange for raising the debt ceiling.¶ The 257-167 vote just after 11 p.m. yesterday capped a tension-filled final push as Republicans balked at a bipartisan Senate bill. Boehner ordered a vote even though 151 of 236 Republicans, including Majority Leader Eric Cantor, ultimately voted no. Obama said he’d sign it into law.¶ “The deficit needs to be reduced in a way that’s balanced,” Obama said at the White House. He said top earners and corporations should pay even more and that Congress must raise the debt ceiling. “Everyone pays their fair share. Everyone does their part,” he said.¶ The final days of drama surrounding the so-called fiscal cliff of scheduled tax increases and spending cuts illustrated the partisan struggle that has made U.S. budget policy unpredictable and prone to crises as deadlines approach. Obama wielded the leverage he gained in his Nov. 6 re-election. Still, he fell short of reaching with Republicans a larger deficit- reduction grand bargain.

### A2: Winners Win

#### Obama always gets blame and only gets blame

Nicholas and Hook 10 **Peter Nicholas and Janet Hook, “Obama the Velcro President,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7—30—10,** [**http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3**](http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3)**, accessed 8-22-11.**

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit. Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate

surrogate.

Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end. So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times. "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) said: "The man came in promising change. He has a higher profile than some presidents because of his youth, his race and the way he came to the White House with the message he brought in. It's naive to believe he can step back and have some Cabinet secretary be the face of the oil spill. The buck stops with his office."

#### Only true for top agenda items.

**Mathews and Todd, 2009** (Chris and Todd, political director at NBC, Hardball, June 22, google)

MATTHEWS: What are the political stakes for Obama get health care passed this year? Does the success of Obama`s presidency ride on it? Chuck Todd is NBC News chief White House correspondent and NBC News political director, as well. Eugene Robinson‘s an MSNBC political analyst, and of course, lest we forget—I never will—Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for “The Washington Post.” MATTHEWS: Gentlemen, let‘s start and I want to start with Chuck, our guy on the beat. One thing we`ve learned, it seems, from presidents is you better win that first year. Reagan won the first year. Bush won the first year. If you win the first year, you really get it going. If you don`t win on your big issue, your pet project, if you will -- and it`s more important than that -- you really set a standard for defeat and you go down to further losses down the road. Your thoughts on this. CHUCK TODD, NBC CORRESPONDENT/POLITICAL DIRECTOR: Well, no, you`re -- A, you`re absolutely right. And B, it`s, like, people that are familiar with the way Rahm Emanuel thinks on trying to strategize when it comes to a legislative agenda and getting these big things done, you know, this is the lessons he feels like he learned the hard way in that first two years of the Clinton administration, `93, `94, when a lot of their big things went down. Sure, they got their big stimulus package, but they never did get health care. And that is what defines those first two years when you look back on it.

#### Overreaching burns capital.

**Politico, 2009** (“RNC hopefuls predict Obama backlash” January 5, google)

The candidates vying to lead the Republican National Committee predicted at a Monday debate that the Obama administration would outspend its political capital and spark a ballot box backlash. “I think they’re going to give us the gift of an overreaching, overpowering government that will limit our freedom,” South Carolina Republican Party Chair Katon Dawson said, arguing that Obama’s agenda would amount to “overpromising and building up bigger government.” Saul Anuzis, who chairs the Michigan GOP, agreed that Obama’s agenda would open up political opportunities for Republicans.